## 1NC

### 1

#### DEBATE NEUTRALIZES ANY EFFICACY OF COUNTER-HEGEMONIC STRATEGIES BY PASSIFYING RESISTANCE IN THE SIMULATION OF SOCIAL DEATH. THERE IS NO HOPE FOR OVERCOMING THE INEVITABLE CO-OPTION OF OPPOSITIONAL POLITICS IN THE CONTEXT OF DEBATE, VOTE NEGATIVE ON PRESUMPTION.

Occupied UC Berkeley 2k9  
[http://anticapitalprojects.wordpress.com/2009/11/19/the-necrosocial/, the necrosocial: civic life, social death, and the UC, nov. 19,]¶ Yes, very much a cemetery. Only here there are no dirges, no prayers, only the repeated testing of our threshold for anxiety, humiliation, and debt. **The classroom just like the workplace just like the university just like the state just like the economy manages our social death, translating what we once knew from high school, from work, from our family life into academic parlance, into acceptable forms of social conflict. Who knew that behind so much civic life** (electoral campaigns, student body representatives, bureaucratic administrators, public relations officials, Peace and Conflict Studies, ad nauseam) **was so much social death? What postures we maintain to claim representation, what limits we assume, what desires we dismiss**? ¶ And in this moment of crisis they ask us to twist ourselves in a way that they can hear. Petitions to Sacramento, phone calls to Congressmen—**even the chancellor** patronizingly **congratulates** **our** September 24th **student strike,** shaping the meaning and the force of the movement as a movement against the policies of Sacramento. **He expands his institutional authority to encompass the movement.** When students begin to hold libraries over night, beginning to take our first baby step as an autonomous movement he reins us in by serendipitously announcing library money. **He manages movement, he kills movement by funneling it into the electoral process. He manages our social death. He looks forward to these battles on his terrain, to eulogize a proposition, to win this or that—he and his look forward to exhausting us**. ¶ **He and his look forward to a reproduction of the logic of representative governance, the release valve of the university plunges us into an abyss where ideas are wisps of ether**—that is, **meaning is ripped from action. Let’s talk about the fight endlessly, but always only in its managed form: to perpetually deliberate, the endless fleshing-out-of. When we push the boundaries of this form they are quick to reconfigure themselves to contain us:** the chancellor’s congratulations, the reopening of the libraries, the managed general assembly—**there is no fight against the administration here, only its own extension. ¶ Each day passes in this way, the administration on the look out to shape student discourse—it happens without pause, we don’t notice nor do we care to. It becomes banal, thoughtless. So much so that we see we are accumulating days: one semester, two, how close to being this or that, how far? This accumulation is our shared history.** This **accumulation**—**every once in a while interrupted, violated by a riot, a wild protest, unforgettable fucking, the overwhelming joy of love, life shattering heartbreak—is a muted, but desirous life. A dead but restless and desirous life.**

#### THEIR SOLVENCY CLAIMS PERFORMATIVELY REDUCES SCHOLARSHIP TO POLITICAL AGENCY. THIS PRODUCES OBLIVIOUSNESS AS TO THE STRUCTURAL ANTAGONISMS WHICH CONSTITUTE ACADEMIC WORK MEANING THEIR ATTEMPTS TO TRANSCEND THE QUAGMIRE OF THEORY AND PRAXIS ARE LINKS TO OUR CRITICISM.

Welsch 12

[scott, “coming to terms with the antagonism between rhetorical reflection and political agency”, vol 45., no. 1, 1-23, prof. communications, appallacia state university]

What does it mean to say rhetoric scholarship should be relevant to democratic¶ practice? A prevailing answer to this question insists that rhetoric scholars are participants¶ in the democratic contest for power just like all other citizens, no more¶ and no less. Drawing on the work of Slavoj Žižek, the argument of this essay is that¶ reducing scholarship to a mode of political agency not only produces an increasingly¶ uninhabitable academic identity but also draws our attention away from producing¶ results of rhetorical inquiry designed to be useful to citizens in democracy. Clinging¶ to the idea that academic practice is a mode of political action produces a fantastic¶ ~~blindness~~ [thoughtlessness] to the antagonism between scholarly reflection and political agency that¶ structures academic purpose. While empirical barriers to the production of rhetorical¶ resources suitable for democratic appropriation undoubtedly exist, ignoring the¶ self-frustrating character of academic desire is no less of an impediment to the¶ production of democratically consequential rhetoric scholarship.¶ Now over a decade since the publication of John Michael’s Anxious Intellects¶ (2000), many rhetoric scholars are no less anxious about the relevance of¶ scholarship to public affairs. Recent exchanges concerning rhetorical criticism,¶ public intellectualism, and academic engagement continue to provide¶ evidence of a prominent felt need to prove public relevance, explain away¶ the lack of readily apparent public engagement, or adopt a more activist¶ posture. That academic work should have political consequences is broadly¶ assumed within a dominant strain of rhetorical scholarship owing to what¶ is doubtless an incontrovertible feature of reality—words have political¶ consequences. From this fact, many rhetoric scholars reason that because¶ our academic words have political consequences, even if we do not intend¶ for them to, we should deliberately pursue the consequences we most desire¶ and seek their victory in political contest.¶ Questions as to the logic underlying this relationship of fact and¶ assertion¶ aside, this article is perhaps partly reducible to the claim that¶ arguments concerning the consequences of scholarship have uncritically¶ referenced such facts. Facts, as many of the same scholars would be quick¶ to point out, do not mean anything apart from the contours our ideological¶ lenses project on them. As Kenneth Burke notes, if a martyr can find joy in¶ the receiving of torturous blows, we should expect the meanings projected¶ onto facts to range widely (1984b, 35). With this in mind, we should be no¶ less concerned with the ways, in the words of Slavoj Žižek, that we “look¶ awry” so as to notice particular facts and invest them with the meaning we¶ do (1991, 8–12).¶ What Žižek adds to Burke’s observation regarding the projection of¶ meaning onto selected events is that this act of projection occurs at the¶ intersection of subjectivity and desire. Beyond charting relationships¶ between terms that constitute an ideology in order to map rhetorically constituted¶ motives, Žižek insists that action is propelled by the insufficiency of¶ those very rhetorical relationships (2008, 103–6). Inseparable from ideology,¶ every identity is constantly haunted by the lurking antagonisms between¶ the terms that structure it. The subject’s desire circulates around the dominant¶ tensions within the language that affords one an identity, continually¶ pursuing the traumatic impossibility of coherent subjectivity or ideological¶ consistency (1989, 124–29). Whereas Burke suggests that every rhetorical¶ language has a kind of rationality that supplies identity and order, Žižek¶ suggests that it is the basic irreconcilability of the competing demands that¶ our symbols place upon us that structures our desire (Žižek 1991, 162–69;¶ Burke 1966, 44–57). We continually pursue not simply the impossible but¶ that which is made impossible by the language of our ideologically constituted¶ identities.¶ I argue that the ongoing debate in rhetorical studies about the relationship¶ between scholarly reflection and political agency is illuminated by¶ Žižek’s account of ideology, identity, and desire. In this debate, references¶ to the factual, the empirical, or the material are deployed, not incidentally,¶ to address the impossible subject position that academics inhabit. Often¶ pursuing lines of research motivated by a desire to create wholeness¶ amid¶ coming to terms with the antagonism¶ 3¶ social, cultural, political, or institutional brokenness, rhetoric¶ scholars¶ nevertheless¶ become, in the sustained act of academic investigation,¶ significantly¶ alienated¶ from motivating practical concerns. Moreover,¶ because rhetoric scholars spend a large majority of their time in faculty¶ offices, classrooms, and archives of one kind or another, by necessity, mostly¶ talking, reading, and writing about political action, the felt alienation from¶ public life can feel like hypocrisy or, even worse, complicity in the perpetuation¶ of brokenness.¶ The subject position inhabited by many rhetoric scholars is not only¶ structured by a fundamental antagonism between scholarly reflection and¶ political agency but also by an antagonism between the production of expert¶ knowledge and a democratic faith in the judgment of the people. An academic¶ produces accounts or recommendations that are intended to enlighten,¶ supplement, or replace those currently accepted by a public imagined to be,¶ at its best, democratic. At the same time, the rhetoric scholar committed¶ to democracy often imagines that the academic’s role is to resist the expert¶ control of publics. Taken together, the two antagonisms yield a deeply conflicted¶ scholarly identity: the suspension of immediate action in favor of¶ reflection can be reduced to an act of complicity in the status quo, just as¶ the act of producing expert accounts can be reduced to the demonstration¶ of a lack of trust in democratic publics. The challenge is to resist synthetically¶ resolving these antagonisms, whether in confirming or disconfirming¶ ways. Rather, as Žižek might suggest, the aim should be to “come to terms”¶ with these antagonisms by articulating academic identities less invested in¶ reparative fantasies that imagine a material resolution of them (1989, 3, 5,¶ 133; 2005, 242–43). Accounts that fail to come to terms with the impossibility¶ of closure and continue to invest in such fantasies yield either indignant¶ calls for activism or too-easy assurance of the potential consequence of one’s¶ work, neither of which is well suited to scholar-citizen engagement.¶ Coming to terms with these antagonisms, I ultimately argue, is aided¶ by a reconsideration of a number of Jürgen Habermas’s (1973, 1970) early¶ works on the relationship between theory and practice and C. Wright¶ Mills’s (2000) account of the relationship between scholarly reflection and¶ political agency in The Sociological Imagination. Turning to Giambattista¶ Vico, Habermas shows us how to keep the antagonisms clearly in view,¶ even though he does not suggest a vision of scholarship that might allow¶ academics to deliberately respond to the antagonism between scholarship¶ and political agency. It is Mills, rather, through his concept of academics¶ working¶ in support of the sociological imagination, who suggests how¶ academics¶ might do just that. Directly and indirectly returning, in a sense,¶ to classical¶ rhetorical roots, each challenges rhetoric scholars to emphasize,¶ as the aim of rhetoric scholarship, the exploration and production of¶ inventional resources suitable for appropriation by citizen-actors. Such a¶ construction of the relationship between academics and politics locates¶ political agency and the situated pursuit of practical wisdom in democratic¶ publics without absolving scholars of responsibility to them.

#### THE AFFIRMATIVE’S FRAMEWORK FOR DEBATE REDUCES SCHOLARLY REFLECTION FO POLITICAL AGENCY WHICH TRAPS ALL OF THEIR SOLVENCY AND CRITICISM CLAIMS WITHIN THE DOWNWARD SPIRAL OF ACADEMICS SPEAKING “TRUTH TO POWER”.

Welsch 12

[scott, “coming to terms with the antagonism between rhetorical reflection and political agency”, vol 45., no. 1, 1-23, prof. communications, appallacia state university]

Klump and Hollihan also show how complete separation between¶ scholarly reflection and political agency is attempted through aesthetic¶ conceits as well. They explain that “so strong was the social scientific image¶ [during the 1950s and 1960s] that the response to it became an artistic¶ self-¶ image—the critic’s task was to increase appreciation for the artistic use¶ of language in the rhetorical act.” They show how a subjective hermeneutic¶ of appreciation does not escape the idea of complete scholarly detachment¶ associated with supposedly objective knowledge-producing science. Klump¶ and Hollihan astutely note how “both of these self-images alienate” (92).¶ They alienate scholars from the consequences of their scholarly work. Both¶ the scientist and the aesthete refuse the antagonism between scholarly¶ reflection and political agency by insisting that the political is alien to each¶ of them. Construed as wholly distinct symbolic spheres, the reflective and¶ the political never have reason to come into contact with each other.¶ While Klump and Hollihan convincingly expose the effacement of¶ the antagonism between scholarly reflection and political agency in both¶ scientific and artistic scholarly identities, they do not recognize, however,¶ that they also efface the antagonism. They simply take the alternate route—¶ refusal by way of declaring an essential oneness between the two. Beyond¶ recognizing the fact that all choices have material consequences, whether¶ intended or not, and arguing that scholars must take them into account,¶ they go a step further and reduce scholarly reflection to a mode of political¶ agency. The reduction [of scholarly reflection to a mode of political agency] proceeds as follows: first, scholars make choices.¶ Second,¶ whether or not they make them intentionally or unintentionally,¶ they will make them nonetheless. Third, those choices will have material¶ consequences (1989, 90–91). Therefore, because our choices, or the words we¶ produce, will have material, political, consequences whether or not we intend¶ them to, we should embrace the consequences we prefer and pursue them¶ directly (the hidden premise being that intentionally pursued consequences¶ are better than unintended ones). Hence, Klump and Hollihan¶ conclude by¶ saying that “the critic that emerges—the interpreter, the teacher, the social¶ actor—is a moral participant, cognizant of the power and responsibility¶ that accompanies full critical participation in his/her society” (1989, 94).¶ scott welsh¶ 8¶ Michael Calvin McGee reduces scholarly reflection to political agency¶ in the same way. At key points, McGee, as well as Klump and Hollihan, refer¶ to Burke’s observation that “all living things are critics,” constantly interpreting¶ the signs around them (Burke 1984b, 5; McGee 1990, 281; Klumpp¶ and Hollihan 1989, 93). And because the signs around us do, in fact, produce¶ much of the social world in which we live, all speech, including academic¶ writing, is inherently political and should be embraced as such. Hence,¶ McGee challenges scholars to engage in “social surgery,” wherein they substitute¶ “new cultural imperatives” for “old taken-for-granted conventions”¶ in order to “make the world conform to their will.” Moreover, as naturalborn¶ critics, like all living things, scholars cannot help but engage in “social¶ surgery” (1990, 281–82). As with Klump and Hollihan, the only remaining¶ question is whether or not they will acknowledge and embrace their true¶ nature. This argument is repeated throughout the “critical rhetoric” literature¶ of the late 1980s and early 1990s. For example, Raymie McKerrow challenges¶ so-called critical rhetoricians to acknowledge their complicity in the¶ production of political culture and take a side. McKerrow advances a liberation¶ theology ethos oriented toward the “the critique of domination” and¶ the emancipation of the oppressed (1989, 93, 103, 106). Although ostensibly¶ responding to McKerrow, Kent Ono and John Sloop largely expand on¶ the ethos implicit or already present in McKerrow’s presentation of critical¶ rhetoric. What they add is the claim that a generalized resistance to rulingclass¶ interests is insufficient to maintain a meaningful, long-term political¶ agenda. What is required is deep investment in a particular cause “able¶ to re-form the individual” (1992, 51). And, just like the other authors, they¶ argue that because even the skeptical critic “often unconsciously commits to¶ a telos despite her attempts to resist the ever-present threat of dogmatism,”¶ critics fully embracing the moral imperative should deliberately, “at the¶ moment of placing pen to paper . . .[,] relinquish skepticism and advance¶ their argument for that moment as if the direction chosen by the critic¶ (i.e. telos) were Truth with a capital ‘T’”(53). This Truth with a capital “T”¶ is not an epistemic conclusion but an unreserved commitment to “the ideal¶ picture we have created for ourselves” of a “utopian future” (1992, 56, 59).¶ Recent contributions across a variety of published forums concerning¶ rhetorical criticism, public intellectualism, and academic engagement¶ demonstrate that this reduction of scholarly reflection to political agency¶ (through the acknowledgment of the fact of complicity) remains influential¶ among rhetoric scholars. In some quarters, it has been radicalized. In the¶ coming to terms with the antagonism¶ 9¶ recent *Western Journal of Communication* special issue on rhetorical criticism,¶ Stephen Hartnett argues, for example, that rhetoric scholars need to get to¶ the point where they “are no longer studying objects from which they hope¶ to glean some truths to be offered as tools to others.” Instead, scholars are¶ to “build projects where they are directly implicated in and work alongside¶ disadvantaged communities.” The ideal is “scholars who are activists¶ writing about their activism” (2010, 78). Hartnett folds scholarly reflection¶ into politics. The former only reemerges as a distinct kind of activity after¶ the fact in reflective accounts of one’s political efforts. Hence, the truly¶ committed “social justice scholar” needs to learn how to “speak clearly and¶ look authoritative” while repeating “mass-media-shaped tidbits” within the¶ “¶ corporate-driven cesspool of mass media” (2010, 81–83). Explicitly affirming¶ the thrust of Hartnett’s essay, Peter Simonson calls on scholars to “transport¶ their bodies outside the cloisters” and into the political field. Similarly,¶ he responds to Celeste Condit’s concern that McGee made “the rhetorical¶ scholar indistinguishable from the street rhetorician” with “I would answer¶ that passing for a street rhetorician might in fact be the ideal” (2010, 121,¶ 95). Likewise, in the recent *Quarterly Journal of Speech* forum on engaged¶ scholarship, Anna Young, Adria Battaglia, and Dana Cloud plainly state¶ that because Aristotle was right that “man is by nature a political animal”¶ we must “reframe politics as our job description” (2010, 433).¶ In the *Philosophy and Rhetoric* forum, Steve Fuller characterizes the¶ “public intellectual” as an “agent of justice.” He deems John Dewey a failed¶ public intellectual because he “refused to use all the available means of persuasion”¶ (2006, 150). His criticism of Dewey, however, is not that Dewey¶ tried and failed to be a public intellectual. Rather, it is Dewey’s alleged¶ refusal itself to be a public intellectual that draws Fuller’s criticism. This is¶ because Fuller’s vision of public intellectualism—a willingness and ability¶ to use all available means of persuasion as an agent of justice—is held up¶ not as an option for some academics in their life outside of the academy but¶ as the essential academic identity. At its best, the academy is “the custodian¶ of the nation’s spirit, the loyal opposition” of whoever holds “the reins of¶ state power at the moment” or the place from which a protected scholarly¶ class is enabled to “speak truth to power.” Using the same logic employed¶ by early critical rhetoricians, anything less is rejected as a cowardly attempt¶ to find an academic identity that “basically absolves intellectuals of any¶ responsibility for their ideas” (2006, 151, 49).

### 2

#### 1. Interpretation: The role of the ballot is to determine if the enactment of a topical plan is better than the status quo or a competitive option. The 1ac must read and defend the implementation of such a topical plan.

#### 2. Violation:

#### A) “Resolved” implies a policy or legislative decision – means they must be resolved about a future federal government policy

Parcher 1

Jeff Parcher, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution.

#### B) USFG is the national government in DC

Encarta Online Encyclopedia, 2k

(http://encarta.msn.com)

“The federal government **of the U**nited **S**tates **is centered in** Washington **DC”**

#### C) Should means there is a practical reason for action

WordNet in ‘97

Princeton University, 1.6

**Should** v 1 : be expected to: “Parties should be fun” 2 : **expresses an** emotional**, practical,** or other **reason for doing something:** “You had better put on warm clothes”; “You should call your mother-in-law”; *“The State ought to repair bridges*”[syn**:** had better, ought]

#### D) Authority is the legal right to take action, power is the ability to do so

Forsythe and Hendrickson 96

[David P. Forsythe, Professor and Chair of Political Science University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Ryan C. Hendrickson, Ph.D. Candidate University of Nebraska-Lincoln. “U.S. Use of Force Abroad: What Law for the President?” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4]

The crisis is most precisely about authority, not power. Authority, in the legal sense, concerns the right to do something. Power refers to the capability to do something. Part of the problems ¶ in the U.S. constitutional crisis over use of force abroad is that the president has the power to ¶ make war, and to obtain congressional deference most of the time, whatever the proper under ¶ standing of authority.

#### 3. Vote Negative:

#### A) Decisionmaking - a limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to decision-making and advocacy skills

Steinberg & Freeley 8

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Discussion of specific policy-questions is crucial for skills development – it overcomes preconceived ideological notions and breaks out of traditional pedagogical frameworks by positing students as agents of decision-making

Esberg & Sagan 12

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These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7 By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

#### Switch-side is key - effective deliberation is crucial to the activation of personal agency and is only possible in a switch-side debate format where debaters divorce themselves from ideology to engage in political contestation – the impact is mass violence

Roberts-Miller 3

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Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism¶ Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into solipsistic and unreflective behavior. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58)¶ What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social."¶ Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with disastrous consequences, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody.¶ It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems, Arendt's solution is the playful and competitive space of agonism; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives.¶ Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is agonistic not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference. This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity.¶ Continued…¶ Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsibility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87).¶ Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes,¶ Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87)¶ Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social.¶ Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4).¶ Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies.¶ Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38).¶ By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others:¶ Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241)¶ There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed.¶ Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259).¶ Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238).¶ The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking.¶ Arendt's Polemical Agonism¶ As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. Persuasive agonism still values conflict, disagreement, and equality among interlocutors, but it has the goal of reaching agreement, as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added).¶ Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it is how one tests the validity of one's thought. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy.¶ Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point:¶ You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42)¶ Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03).¶ In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes.¶ This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate.¶ Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263).¶ Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth; it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered. Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242).¶ Agonism demands that one simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions, rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think. The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324).¶ Yet, there are important positive political consequences of agonism.¶ Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how the system could be actively moral. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the evil of conformity—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state makes possible extraordinary evil carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill undermines the political force of conformity, so it is a force against the bureaucratizing of evil. If people think for themselves, they will resist dogma; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, they will resist totalitarianism. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action.¶ In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere. On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric.

#### B) Dialogue – our entire negative strategy is based on the “should” question of the resolution---there are an infinite number of reasons that the scholarship of their advocacy could be a reason to vote affirmative--- these all obviate the only predictable strategies based on topical action---they overstretch our research burden and undermine preparedness for all debates making effective deliberation impossible which makes it impossible to be negative – voting issue for limits and ground

### 3

#### The 1AC ignores that racism is merely one amongst many tools of axiological anthropocentrism whereby violence can always be justified when applied to racially inferior groups. Only a critique which focuses on rejecting subhuman thinking can contest the myriad forms of racism.

Deckha 2k10 [Maneesha, faculty of law, university of Victoria, “it’s time to abandon the idea of human rights”, the scavenger, dec. 10]

While the intersection of race and gender is often acknowledged in understanding the etiology of justificatory narratives for war, the presence of species distinctions and the importance of the subhuman are less appreciated. Yet, the race (and gender) thinking that animates Razack’s argument in normalizing violence for detainees (and others) is also centrally sustained by the subhuman figure. As Charles Patterson notes with respect to multiple forms of exploitation: Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species, our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animas and do the same to them. Patterson emphasizes how the human/animal hierarchy and our ideas about animals and animality are foundational for intra-human hierarchies and the violence they promote. The routine violence against beings designated subhuman serves as both a justification and blueprint for violence against humans. For example, in discussing the specific dynamics of the Nazi camps, Patterson further notes how techniques to make the killing of detainees resemble the slaughter of animals were deliberately implemented in order to make the killing seem more palatable and benign. That the detainees were made naked and kept crowded in the gas chambers facilitated their animalization and, in turn, their death at the hands of other humans who were already culturally familiar and comfortable with killing animals in this way. Returning to Razack’s exposition of race thinking in contemporary camps, one can see how subhuman thinking is foundational to race thinking. One of her primary arguments is that race thinking, which she defines as “the denial of a common bond of humanity between people of European descent and those who are not”, is “a defining feature of the world order” today as in the past. In other words, it is the “species thinking” that helps to create the racial demarcation. As Razack notes with respect to the specific logic infusing the camps, they “are not simply contemporary excesses born of the west’s current quest for security, but instead represent a more ominous, permanent arrangement of who is and is not a part of the human community”. Once placed outside the “human” zone by race thinking, the detainees may be handled lawlessly and thus with violence that is legitimated at all times. Racialization is not enough and does not complete their Othering experience. Rather, they must be dehumanized for the larger public to accept the violence against them and the increasing “culture of exception” which sustains these human bodily exclusions. Although nonhumans are not the focus of Razack’s work, the centrality of the subhuman to the logic of the camps and racial and sexual violence contained therein is also clearly illustrated in her specific examples. In the course of her analysis, to determine the import of race thinking in enabling violence, Razack quotes a newspaper story that describes the background mentality of Private Lynndie England, the white female soldier made notorious by images of her holding onto imprisoned and naked Iraqi men with a leash around their necks. The story itself quotes a resident from England’s hometown who says the following about the sensibilities of individuals from their town: To the country boys here, if you’re a different nationality, a different race, you’re sub-human. That’s the way that girls like Lynndie England are raised. Tormenting Iraqis, in her mind, would be no different from shooting a turkey. Every season here you’re hunting something. Over there they’re hunting Iraqis. Razack extracts this quote to illustrate how “race overdetermined what went on”, but it may also be observed that species “overdetermined what went on”. Race has a formative function, to be sure, but it works in conjunction with species difference to enable the violence at Abu Ghraib and other camps. Dehumanization promotes racialization, which further entrenches both identities. It is an intertwined logic of race, sex, culture and species that lays the foundation for the violence.

#### This species-contingent paradigm creates unending genocidal violence against forms of life deemed politically unqualified.

KOCHI & ORDAN 2K8 [tarik and noam, queen’s university and bar llan university, “an argument for the global suicide of humanity”, vol 7. no. 4., bourderlands e-journal]

Within the picture many paint of humanity, events such as the Holocaust are considered as an exception, an aberration. The Holocaust is often portrayed as an example of ‘evil’, a moment of hatred, madness and cruelty (cf. the differing accounts of ‘evil’ given in Neiman, 2004). The event is also treated as one through which humanity comprehend its own weakness and draw strength, via the resolve that such actions will never happen again. However, if we take seriously the differing ways in which the Holocaust was ‘evil’, then one must surely include along side it the almost uncountable numbers of genocides that have occurred throughout human history. Hence, if we are to think of the content of the ‘human heritage’, then this must include the annihilation of indigenous peoples and their cultures across the globe and the manner in which their beliefs, behaviours and social practices have been erased from what the people of the ‘West’ generally consider to be the content of a human heritage. Again the history of colonialism is telling here. It reminds us exactly how normal, regular and mundane acts of annihilation of different forms of human life and culture have been throughout human history. Indeed the history of colonialism, in its various guises, points to the fact that so many of our legal institutions and forms of ethical life (i.e. nation-states which pride themselves on protecting human rights through the rule of law) have been founded upon colonial violence, war and the appropriation of other peoples’ land (Schmitt, 2003; Benjamin, 1986). Further, the history of colonialism highlights the central function of ‘race war’ that often underlies human social organisation and many of its legal and ethical systems of thought (Foucault, 2003). This history of modern colonialism thus presents a key to understanding that events such as the Holocaust are not an aberration and exception but are closer to the norm, and sadly, lie at the heart of any heritage of humanity. After all, all too often the European colonisation of the globe was justified by arguments that indigenous inhabitants were racially ‘inferior’ and in some instances that they were closer to ‘apes’ than to humans (Diamond, 2006). Such violence justified by an erroneous view of ‘race’ is in many ways merely an extension of an underlying attitude of speciesism involving a long history of killing and enslavement of non-human species by humans. Such a connection between the two histories of inter-human violence (via the mythical notion of differing human ‘races’) and interspecies violence, is well expressed in Isaac Bashevis Singer’s comment that whereas humans consider themselves “the crown of creation”, for animals “all people are Nazis” and animal life is “an eternal Treblinka” (Singer, 1968, p.750).

#### The alternative is that the judge should vote negative to REJECT THE HUMAN/ANIMAL DIVIDE. This rejection enables an understanding of the species-being. That solves the ethical contradiction of their species-level racism.

HUDSON 2K4 [Laura, The Political Animal: Species-Being and Bare Life, mediations journal, <http://www.mediationsjournal.org/files/Mediations23_2_04.pdf>]

We are all equally reduced to mere specimens of human biology, mute and uncomprehending of the world in which we are thrown. Species-being, or “humanity as a species,” may require this recognition to move beyond the pseudo-essence of the religion of humanism. Recognizing that what we call “the human” is an abstraction that fails to fully describe what we are, we may come to find a new way of understanding humanity that recuperates the natural without domination. The bare life that results from expulsion from the law removes even the illusion of freedom. Regardless of one’s location in production, the threat of losing even the fiction of citizenship and freedom affects everyone. This may create new means of organizing resistance across the particular divisions of society. Furthermore, the concept of bare life allows us to gesture toward a more detailed, concrete idea of what species-being may look like. Agamben hints that in the recognition of this fact, that in our essence we are all animals, that we are all living dead, might reside the possibility of a kind of redemption. Rather than the mystical horizon of a future community, the passage to species-being may be experienced as a deprivation, a loss of identity. Species-being is not merely a positive result of the development of history; it is equally the absence of many of the features of “humanity” through which we have learned to make sense of our world. It is an absence of the kind of individuality and atomism that structure our world under capitalism and underlie liberal democracy, and which continue to inform the tenets of deep ecology. The development of species-being requires the collapse of the distinction between human and animal in order to change the shape of our relationships with the natural world. A true species-being depends on a sort of reconciliation between our “human” and “animal” selves, a breakdown of the distinction between the two both within ourselves and in nature in general. Bare life would then represent not only expulsion from the law but the possibility of its overcoming. Positioned in the zone of indistinction, no longer a subject of the law but still subjected to it through absence, what we equivocally call “the human” in general becomes virtually indistinguishable from the animal or nature. But through this expulsion and absence, we may see not only the law but the system of capitalism that shapes it from a position no longer blinded or captivated by its spell. The structure of the law is revealed as always suspect in the false division between natural and political life, which are never truly separable. Though clearly the situation is not yet as dire as Agamben’s invocation of the Holocaust suggests, we are all, as citizens, under the threat of the state of exception. With the decline of the nation as a form of social organization, the whittling away of civil liberties and, with them, the state’s promise of “the good life” (or “the good death”) even in the most developed nations, with the weakening of labor as the bearer of resistance to exploitation, how are we to envision the future of politics and society?

### Case

**The success of anti-state and anti-imperialism efforts relies on working with the state and legal institutions, the alternative is war and genocide.**

**Shaw**, Professor of International Relations and Politics at the University of Sussex, **’99** (Martin, November 9, “The unfinished global revolution: Intellectuals and the new politics of international relations”

**The new politics of international relations require us**, therefore, **to go beyond** the **antiimperialism of the intellectual left as well as of the semi-anarchist traditions of the academic discipline**. We need to recognise three **fundamental** truths: First, in the twenty-first century **people struggling for democratic liberties across the non-Western world are likely to make constant demands on our solidarity**. Courageous academics, **students and** other **intellectuals will be in the forefront of these movements**. They deserve the unstinting support of intellectuals **in the West**. Second, the old international thinking in which democratic movements are seen as purely internal to states no longer carries conviction – despite the lingering nostalgia for it on both the American right and the anti-American left. **The idea that global principles can and should be enforced worldwide is firmly established in the minds of hundreds of millions of people**. This consciousness will a powerful force in the coming decades. Third, **global state-formation is a fact. International institutions are being extended, and they have a symbiotic relation with the major centre of state power**, the increasingly internationalised Western conglomerate. **The success of the global-democratic revolutionary wave depends** first on how well it is consolidated in each national context – but second, **on how thoroughly it is embedded**

**in international networks of power, at the centre of which, inescapably, is the West**. From these political fundamentals, strategic propositions can be derived. First, **democratic movements cannot regard** non-governmental organisations and **civil society as ends in themselves. They must aim to civilise** local **states, rendering them open, accountable and pluralistic, and curtail the arbitrary and violent exercise of power**. Second, **democratising local states is not a separate task from integrating them into global** and often Western-centred **networks**. **Reproducing isolated local centres of power carries with it classic dangers of states as centres of war.** **Embedding global norms and integrating new state centres with global institutional frameworks are essential to the control of violence**. (To put this another way, the proliferation of purely national democracies is not a recipe for peace.) Third, while the global revolution cannot do without the West and the UN, neither can it rely on them unconditionally. **We need** these **power networks, but we need to tame them**, too, **to make their** messy **bureaucracies** enormously **more accountable and sensitive to** the needs of **society** worldwide. **This will involve** the kind of ‘**cosmopolitan democracy’** argued for by David Held80 and campaigned for by the new Charter 9981. **It will** also **require us to advance a global social-democratic agenda, to address** the literally catastrophic scale of **world social inequalities**. Fourth, **if we need the global-Western state, if we want to democratise it and make its institutions friendlier to global peace and justice, we cannot be indifferent to its strategic debates. It matters to develop robust peacekeeping as a strategic alternative to bombing our way through zones of crisis. It matters that international intervention supports pluralist structures, rather than ratifying Bosnia-style apartheid**. Likewise, **the internal politics of Western elites matter. It makes a difference to halt the regression to isolationist nationalism in American politics**. It matters that the European Union should develop into a democratic polity with a globally responsible direction. It matters that the British state, still a pivot of the Western system of power, stays in the hands of outward-looking new social democrats rather than inward-looking old conservatives. **As political intellectuals in the West**, we need to have our eyes on the ball at our feet, but we also need to raise them to the horizon. **We need to grasp the historic drama that is transforming worldwide relationships between people and state**, as well as between state and state. **We need to think about how the turbulence of the global revolution can be consolidated in democratic, pluralist, international networks of both social relations and state authority**. We cannot be simply optimistic about this prospect. Sadly, it will require repeated violent political crises to push Western governments towards the required restructuring of world institutions.82 What I have outlined tonight is a huge challenge; but **the alternative is to see the global revolution splutter into defeat, degenerate into new genocidal wars, perhaps even nuclear conflicts. The practical challenge for all concerned citizens**, and the theoretical and analytical challenges for **students of international relations and politics, are intertwined**.

**Social movements must work with and along-side legal institutions. Rejection of the law kills solvency.**

Peter **Gabel**, former President and Professor of Law at New College of California, 200**9** (“LAW AND ECONOMICS, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES, AND THE HIGHER LAW: CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES AS A SPIRITUAL PRACTICE.” 36 Pepp. L. Rev. 515. Lexis )

This calls not for a rejection of past CLS work, but for a reclaiming of the spiritual dimension of that work. And this in turn **requires** a **reunderstanding** of the indeterminacy critique as being merely an analytical moment within the synthesis of a moral critique, as a kind of analytical insight that indicates that the world is open-textured but not going nowhere, and **that legal reasoning's claims that would fix the world in idealized,** reified **abstractions** legitimizing injustice and alienation **are** actually **a passivizing defense against the freedom** and creative challenge **of social vulnerability** and uncharted possibility. [\*530] **But** this also requires a new agenda for our movement that cooperates with the world-wide spiritual-political initiatives that have sprung up since the post-'60s era from which CLS first emerged, and that would be tremendously supportive of our efforts. These spiritual-political initiatives include the religious renewal movements that are linking the spiritual ideal of the beloved community to social action and social change; spiritually informed secular movements like the Network of Spiritual Progressives that are trying to invent new forms of spiritual activism while rethinking foreign and domestic social policy reforms to emphasize spiritual transformation rather than merely liberal redistribution of resources and rights; 31 and the efforts of the environmental and ecology movements to link the redemption of the planet with social healing and sustainable, cooperative economies. All of **these efforts require a** new **legal culture that links justice with** explicitly **spiritual outcomes** - outcomes **that foster empathy, compassion, and social connection** rather than the vindication of liberal rights in a legal order founded upon the fear-based separation of self and other. One lesson that CLS scholarship itself has taught is **that it is impossible for a social transformation movement to be successful without an ability to express its own ideals** as also ideals of justice that can achieve legitimate political expression **through legal culture. Without that**, as Karl Klare, Alan Freeman, and many others have shown, 32 **the movement's** radical **ideals will be recast and stolen away by the** liberal interpretations **those movements will suffer through the prism of legal assumptions that actually contradict them**. Thus while the movement must create the "parallel universe" that can affirm the ontological/epistemological validity of the possibility of a society based on love and mutual recognition, the movement also requires a legal expression of itself that declares this same realization of love and mutual recognition to be indispensable to just outcomes of social conflicts. Such a parallel justice system has already begun to sprout up across the legal landscape, alongside the antagonism of self and other, presupposed and reinforced by the mainstream's adversary system. Among its manifestations are the truly remarkable restorative justice movement, which understands crime and social violence as expressive of a breakdown in community and aspires to apology and forgiveness through direct encounters between victims and offenders as a means of restoration of the communal fabric; 33 the transformative and understanding-based mediation movements that make compassion a central objective to the resolution of civil conflicts; 34 the new [\*531] forms of spiritually-informed law practice that are redefining the lawyer-client relationship as a non-technical, holistic relationship in which lawyers bring a substantive moral and healing vision to bear on the client's perception of his or her "interests," and the relation of those interests to the well-being of the larger community; 35 and the transformation of legal education away from a focus on the mere manipulation of existing rules and doctrine, toward a more humane and spiritually integrated conception of law and justice. What these new efforts need from **a revitalized critical legal studies** movement is a scholarship and pedagogy that provides in every field a critique of existing law and legal culture that **reveals the limitations of the liberal world-view** out of which the existing order was constructed in the centuries since the Enlightenment, and that points toward the socially connected community that ought to be its successor. It is this intellectual piece of the puzzle that is lacking from **all of the recent efforts** to transform legal practice in the ways I have just described; all of these efforts without exception, as far as I know, **challenge the** individualized, antagonistic, and despiritualized **character of the** adversary **system without challenging the substantive content of existing law** or the analytical thought process of legal reasoning. Both of these elements of legal culture - **the critique of the substance of legal rules and doctrine**, and the critique of detached, analytical rule-application through abstract, logical technique resting on a normative foundation - **require** a cadre of **intellectuals to** help disassemble what is and **point to what ought to be**, as a "moment" in the transformation from the individualistic, liberal world we inhabit to **a post-liberal socially connected**, loving, **and compassionate world to which we aspire**. So, for example, a CLS course in Contracts should subordinate its use of the indeterminacy critique to a meaning-centered critique emphasizing how the rules presupposing the legitimacy and desirability of individualistic, self-interested bargains (adjusted by a touch of concern for "the reliance interest") among an infinite number of socially disconnected strangers bound by no common moral purpose or spiritually bonded social community outside their respective blood relatives are rapidly destroying the planet, in part, by making use of liberal abstractions like freedom of choice that make it appear that this lonely destiny is what people really want. Or a course in [\*532] Torts should make it clear to students that there is more to the obligations born of our essential connection to each other as social beings than the duty to not pull chairs out from under each other as we are about to sit down to dinner, or not to smash into each others' cars, or injure each other with exploding Coke bottles - that the bond of recognition itself, and what Emmanuel Levinas calls the ethical demand of the face of the Other, 36 means we have a duty to "rescue" each other, that we must take care of each other, including the poor, the homeless, and those who lack health care. CLS scholars and teachers should extend - and in many instances already have extended - this kind of critical analysis to every area of law, including developing a critical reflection on the Constitution as a liberal and individualistic document that was a great advance in its time but now must be transformed to embrace a newly evolving vision of spiritual community that was not even conceived of as a universal necessity in the late eighteenth century when it was drafted. Concomitant with the transformation of doctrine must come a transformation of remedy, beyond money damages passed between socially separated litigants conceived as interested only in material outcomes, and beyond a due process model of civil and criminal procedure that links justice to merely the vindication of rights through the dutiful monitoring of a fact-based public hearing that leaves the parties as disconnected or more disconnected than when their legal process began. And finally, supporting such a re-visioning of doctrine, remedy, and process must be a rethinking of legal reasoning itself that goes beyond the normative circularity of the application of indeterminate rules presupposing the legitimacy of the secular liberal order toward a morally grounded reflection anchored in the common effort to realize the values of love, compassion, and mutual concern and well-being that are being carried forward by the movement itself as it tries to link the transformative element of its own social being with a new legal knowledge that would be expressive of it. **If CLS would embrace the** moral and **spiritual agenda** that I'm proposing here, **it would instantly revitalize itself**. Everywhere today there are law students and young legal scholars trying to figure out how to devote their lives and work to addressing the problems of global warming and the destruction of the environment, to overcoming the social violence and irrationality of religious fundamentalism and pathological, secular nationalism, and to challenging the human indifference of corporate globalization and its blind and reeling world markets. But Marxist materialism can no longer speak to these new generations of potential activists who have become aware that these problems require a spiritually grounded solution, and after a thirty-year assault by the New Right, **no one** [\*533] **believes** any longer **in the model of regulatory government as morally capable of containing and altering a civil society founded upon Fear of the Other and private self-interest. A new** spiritual **activism** actually **connecting Self and Other is** clearly **what is needed**, and it is already coming into being in hundreds of hopeful incarnations. If CLS were to rediscover itself as the legal-intellectual expression of that world-wide effort, it could once again challenge legal education and legal scholarship to become vehicles of the creation of a better world, connecting the worthwhile body of work already produced by its older generations with new, more spiritually confident work yet to be written by the young.

## 2NC

### K

#### **No cards**

### Case

#### Addressing problems created by political institutions is the best way to challenge oppression

Bush 11

(Melanie, Associate Professor and Chair, Anthropology & Sociology @ Adelphi University, Everyday Forms of Whiteness: Understanding Race in a “Post-Racial” World, p. 235-236)

Carol Geary Schneider, president of the Association of American Colleges and Universities, has been quoted as saying, "Very few courses in the contemporary undergraduate curriculum directly address democratic principles and/or aspirations" (Schneider 1999, 9). She further asked where in the curriculum are students engaged about concepts of justice, democracy, equality, opportunity, and liberty and suggested that these challenging topics belong in general education because they are integral dimensions of American pluralism and must be understood in the context of their historical connections(Schneider 1999, 9). This engagement is central to the development of civic responsibility and social awareness as a core tenet of higher education. While most of the work on civic engagement does not speak to the issues of involvement in political projects or the world of social movements, the history of democracy in the United States alone and certainly globally is one that situates these activities squarely within the realm of liberal education and civic engagement. This may be avoided out of concern for partisanship, because of a perception that service is good, activism is problematic or is a result of efforts to sustain the status quo. Regardless of the reason, it is important to note the significant value that comes from political involvement especially aimed not only on raising awareness or affecting individuals, but also toward structural change(Bush and Little 2009). Learning aboutpolitical institutions**,** issues, contexts, and practices should be an integral part of that enterprise (liberal arts education). College graduates cannot make sense of their environment and their place in it if they are politically ignorant, unskilled, and lacking in a sense of civic agency, the sense that they can work with others to solve problems that concern them—in their communities, workplaces**,** .. ." (Colby 2008: 8 ) Overall, every opportunity to advance a broad-based and deepened understanding about the global dynamics of white supremacy, including its material impact on the lives of all people, should be pursued. This effort couldcultivate a counter narrative that deals with white racism from "cradle to grave."29 It can also provide incentive tothe large numbers of white peopleoutside the ruling class, whose acceptance of the status quo contributes to the entrenchment of the patterns of racial inequality and injustice that threaten our future, to perhaps redefine their allegiancesand reconfigure their notion of "who's to blame."

#### I’ll finish shaw now

**in international networks of power, at the centre of which, inescapably, is the West**. From these political fundamentals, strategic propositions can be derived. First, **democratic movements cannot regard** non-governmental organisations and **civil society as ends in themselves. They must aim to civilise** local **states, rendering them open, accountable and pluralistic, and curtail the arbitrary and violent exercise of power**. Second, **democratising local states is not a separate task from integrating them into global** and often Western-centred **networks**. **Reproducing isolated local centres of power carries with it classic dangers of states as centres of war.** **Embedding global norms and integrating new state centres with global institutional frameworks are essential to the control of violence**. (To put this another way, the proliferation of purely national democracies is not a recipe for peace.) Third, while the global revolution cannot do without the West and the UN, neither can it rely on them unconditionally. **We need** these **power networks, but we need to tame them**, too, **to make their** messy **bureaucracies** enormously **more accountable and sensitive to** the needs of **society** worldwide. **This will involve** the kind of ‘**cosmopolitan democracy’** argued for by David Held80 and campaigned for by the new Charter 9981. **It will** also **require us to advance a global social-democratic agenda, to address** the literally catastrophic scale of **world social inequalities**. Fourth, **if we need the global-Western state, if we want to democratise it and make its institutions friendlier to global peace and justice, we cannot be indifferent to its strategic debates. It matters to develop robust peacekeeping as a strategic alternative to bombing our way through zones of crisis. It matters that international intervention supports pluralist structures, rather than ratifying Bosnia-style apartheid**. Likewise, **the internal politics of Western elites matter. It makes a difference to halt the regression to isolationist nationalism in American politics**. It matters that the European Union should develop into a democratic polity with a globally responsible direction. It matters that the British state, still a pivot of the Western system of power, stays in the hands of outward-looking new social democrats rather than inward-looking old conservatives. **As political intellectuals in the West**, we need to have our eyes on the ball at our feet, but we also need to raise them to the horizon. **We need to grasp the historic drama that is transforming worldwide relationships between people and state**, as well as between state and state. **We need to think about how the turbulence of the global revolution can be consolidated in democratic, pluralist, international networks of both social relations and state authority**. We cannot be simply optimistic about this prospect. Sadly, it will require repeated violent political crises to push Western governments towards the required restructuring of world institutions.82 What I have outlined tonight is a huge challenge; but **the alternative is to see the global revolution splutter into defeat, degenerate into new genocidal wars, perhaps even nuclear conflicts. The practical challenge for all concerned citizens**, and the theoretical and analytical challenges for **students of international relations and politics, are intertwined**.

#### the government” which allows violence to go unchecked – that’s Roberts-Miller ‘3

### FW

#### Broad interpretations cause unmanageable research burdens

Taylor 5

Taylor III, now a JD from William and Mary, 2005¶ (Jarred, “Searching for a More Perfect Union,” <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ypiOXjRVPWzNxDsFVJ0S1n-QfIGtXzp7Y59meEwd-bE/edit?hl=en_US>)

**It would take even the most seasoned scholar years of research and hundreds of pages to** adequately **analyze** the development of **any presidential power** over the course of American history; **war power is** certainly **no exception**. Every President since George Washington has interpreted the martial prerogatives of his office in different ways, and most have set some sort of precedent for succeeding officeholders. Nevertheless, some of the major changes in executive military power bear highlighting.

#### Limits literally double the educational benefit of debate

Arrington 2009

(Rebecca, UVA Today, “Study Finds That Students Benefit From Depth, Rather Than Breadth, in High School Science Courses” March 4)

A recent study reports that high school students who study fewer science topics, but study them in greater depth, have an advantage in college science classes over their peers who study more topics and spend less time on each. Robert Tai, associate professor at the University of Virginia's Curry School of Education, worked with Marc S. Schwartz of the University of Texas at Arlington and Philip M. Sadler and Gerhard Sonnert of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics to conduct the study and produce the report. "Depth Versus Breadth: How Content Coverage in High School Courses Relates to Later Success in College Science Coursework" relates the amount of content covered on a particular topic in high school classes with students' performance in college-level science classes. The study will appear in the July 2009 print edition of Science Education and is currently available as an online pre-print from the journal. "As a former high school teacher, I always worried about whether it was better to teach less in greater depth or more with no real depth. This study offers evidence that teaching fewer topics in greater depth is a better way to prepare students for success in college science," Tai said. "These results are based on the performance of thousands of college science students from across the United States." The 8,310 students in the study were enrolled in introductory biology, chemistry or physics in randomly selected four-year colleges and universities. Those who spent one month or more studying one major topic in-depth in high school earned higher grades in college science than their peers who studied more topics in the same period of time. The study revealed that students in courses that focused on mastering a particular topic were impacted twice as much as those in courses that touched on every major topic

## 1NR

### AT: Perm – Generic

#### Perm links more: it attempts to direct criticism towards politics conducted in the name of a life which excludes bare life in favor of the voice of the citizen, the politically qualified. This excludes bare life and establishes a realm beyond of the markers of the “political” in which to conduct genocidal violence against exceptional beings.

HUDSON 2K4 [Laura, The Political Animal: Species-Being and Bare Life, mediations journal, http://www.mediationsjournal.org/files/Mediations23\_2\_04.pdf]

The rise of environmentalism, deep ecology, and animal rights can be seen as effects of this inability of law, or the Law, to distance the “natural world” as a state outside itself. **Natural objects reappear within the political realm not as political actors but as markers of bare life.** **Sovereignty, in seeking to establish a political life separate from the state of nature, produces both political life as the life proper to the citizen (the “good life”) and bare life**, which occupies a space in between bios and zoē, evacuated of meaning. **The state of nature is not separate from political life but a state that exists alongside political life, as a necessary corollary of its existence. Political life is alienation from an imagined state of nature that we cannot access as human beings because it appears only in shadow form as bare life. The state of exception is that which defines which lives lack value, which lives can be killed without being either murdered or sacrificed.** Agamben’s examples of the inextricable link between political and bare life focus on the limit cases of humanity rather than the ideal, providing an analysis of precisely the cases that prove problematic in Ferry’s liberal humanism. The exception, as that which proves the rule, cannot be avoided. It is necessary to look to the figure of the refugee, the body of the “overcomatose” or the severely mentally impaired, and, under the Third Reich, the life of the Jew to see how the law fails in the task Ferry sets for it. **These cases demonstrate the zone of indistinction that Agamben elaborates as the zone of “life that does not deserve to live**.” The refugee demonstrates the necessity of a link between nation and subject; **refugees are no longer citizens and, as such, lack a claim to political rights: “In the system of the nation-state, the so-called sacred and inalienable rights of man show themselves to lack every protection and reality at the moment in which they can no longer take the form of rights belonging to citizens of a state**.”[15] **Confronted with the figure of the refugee, human rights are faced with their hidden ground in national origin, where, as Agamben notes, the key term is birth: men are born free, invoking the natural codes from which law was to separate us. This freedom is, in actuality, a function of citizenship and incorporation in the nation-state rather than a fact of being human: “citizenship names the new status of life as origin and ground of sovereignty and, therefore, literally identifies** … les membres du souverain, **‘the members of the sovereign.’”[16] This makes the link between that which is proper to the nation and that which is proper to the citizen the determinant of the zone of sacred life: those who do not fulfill the role of the citizen are no longer guaranteed protection or participation in political life, their so-called human rights void in the absence of national identity. The refugee or refugees as a group have a claim only to bare life, to being kept alive, but have no political voice with which to demand the rights of the citizen.** Agamben, while noting the same trend toward politicizing natural life that concerns Ferry, demonstrates that this politicization is already contained within the structure of politics itself. **This corresponds to the position of animals in human society: the exemplar of the limit case, they have always existed in the state of exception that founds the political. There is thus a connection between the plight of the refugee and that of the animal: neither participates directly in the political, though both are absolutely subject to political decisions in which they have no voice. The establishment of a realm outside the political, where lives have no value and thus may be killed, is marked by the difference between the human and the animal.**

### Turns Race

#### And, anthropocentric discourse and tropes cause racial criminalization and stigma faster than it can be recognized. That means our internal link is triggered at a level which your solvency mechanism has no risk of capturing by contrast to our alt which can arguably solve a proximate cause of racism.

Stanford University 2k8 [February 7). Discrimination Against Blacks Linked To Dehumanization, Study Finds. ScienceDaily. Retrieved January 25, 2012, from <http://www.sciencedaily.com­/releases/2008/02/080207163811.htm>]

ScienceDaily (Feb. 7, 2008) — Crude historical depictions of African Americans as ape-like may have disappeared from mainstream U.S. culture, but research presented in a new paper by psychologists at Stanford, Pennsylvania State University and the University of California-Berkeley reveals that many Americans subconsciously associate blacks with apes. In addition, the findings show that society is more likely to condone violence against black criminal suspects as a result of its broader inability to accept African Americans as fully human, according to the researchers. Co-author Jennifer Eberhardt, a Stanford associate professor of psychology who is black, said she was shocked by the results, particularly since they involved subjects born after Jim Crow and the civil rights movement. "This was actually some of the most depressing work I have done," she said. "This shook me up. You have suspicions when you do the work—intuitions—you have a hunch. But it was hard to prepare for how strong [the black-ape association] was—how we were able to pick it up every time." The paper, "Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization and Contemporary Consequences," is the result of a series of six previously unpublished studies conducted by Eberhardt, Pennsylvania State University psychologist Phillip Atiba Goff (the lead author and a former student of Eberhardt's) and Matthew C. Jackson and Melissa J. Williams, graduate students at Penn State and Berkeley, respectively. The paper is scheduled to appear Feb. 7 in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, which is published by the American Psychological Association. The research took place over six years at Stanford and Penn State under Eberhardt's supervision. It involved mostly white male undergraduates. In a series of studies that subliminally flashed black or white male faces on a screen for a fraction of a second to "prime" the students, researchers found subjects could identify blurry ape drawings much faster after they were primed with black faces than with white faces. The researchers consistently discovered a black-ape association even if the young adults said they knew nothing about its historical connotations. The connection was made only with African American faces; the paper's third study failed to find an ape association with other non-white groups, such as Asians. Despite such race-specific findings, the researchers stressed that dehumanization and animal imagery have been used for centuries to justify violence against many oppressed groups. "Despite widespread opposition to racism, bias remains with us," Eberhardt said. "African Americans are still dehumanized; we're still associated with apes in this country. That association can lead people to endorse the beating of black suspects by police officers, and I think it has lots of other consequences that we have yet to uncover." Historical background Scientific racism in the United States was graphically promoted in a mid-19th-century book by Josiah C. Nott and George Robins Gliddon titled Types of Mankind, which used misleading illustrations to suggest that "Negroes" ranked between "Greeks" and chimpanzees. "When we have a history like that in this country, I don't know how much of that goes away completely, especially to the extent that we are still dealing with severe racial inequality, which fuels and maintains those associations in ways that people are unaware," Eberhardt said. Although such grotesque characterizations of African Americans have largely disappeared from mainstream U.S. society, Eberhardt noted that science education could be partly responsible for reinforcing the view that blacks are less evolved than whites. An iconic 1970 illustration, "March of Progress," published in the Time-Life book Early Man, depicts evolution beginning with a chimpanzee and ending with a white man. "It's a legacy of our past that the endpoint of evolution is a white man," Eberhardt said. "I don't think it's intentional, but when people learn about human evolution, they walk away with a notion that people of African descent are closer to apes than people of European descent. When people think of a civilized person, a white man comes to mind." Consequences of socially endorsed violence In the paper's fifth study, the researchers subliminally primed 115 white male undergraduates with words associated with either apes (such as "monkey," "chimp," "gorilla") or big cats (such as "lion," "tiger," "panther"). The latter was used as a control because both images are associated with violence and Africa, Eberhardt said. The subjects then watched a two-minute video clip, similar to the television program COPS, depicting several police officers violently beating a man of undetermined race. A mugshot of either a white or a black man was shown at the beginning of the clip to indicate who was being beaten, with a description conveying that, although described by his family as "a loving husband and father," the suspect had a serious criminal record and may have been high on drugs at the time of his arrest. The students were then asked to rate how justified the beating was. Participants who believed the suspect was white were no more likely to condone the beating when they were primed with either ape or big cat words, Eberhardt said. But those who thought the suspect was black were more likely to justify the beating if they had been primed with ape words than with big cat words. "Taken together, this suggests that implicit knowledge of a Black-ape association led to marked differences in participants' judgments of Black criminal suspects," the researchers write. According to the paper's authors, this link has devastating consequences for African Americans because it "alters visual perception and attention, and it increases endorsement of violence against black suspects." For example, the paper's sixth study showed that in hundreds of news stories from 1979 to 1999 in the Philadelphia Inquirer, African Americans convicted of capital crimes were about four times more likely than whites convicted of capital crimes to be described with ape-relevant language, such as "barbaric," "beast," "brute," "savage" and "wild." "Those who are implicitly portrayed as more ape-like in these articles are more likely to be executed by the state than those who are not," the researchers write.

### Middle Passage/Slavery

#### Problematizing the middle passage and human slavery ignores that these tools were not produced and then simply applied to a racial group of humans to force their migration but instead were first the means of dominating nonhumans. We must begin with this hidden foundation of species violence.

HEYDT 2K10 [samantha, american abattoirs, December 20th, <http://samheydt.wordpress.com/2010/12/20/224/>, BA Communications New School and Universitat van Amsterdam ]

The American abattoir paved the road to Auschwitz. The industrialization of death developed at the turn of the century in the US stockyards was adopted by the Nazi Concentration camps, where sectors of humanity relegated into the realm of ‘subhuman’ were slaughtered. History repeats itself with the algorithms of domination shifting not in construct but in context. The assembly-line technology and eugenic ideology that buttresses the mechanized mass murder of animals share the rationalized cruelty that has historically been used in the Western context against humans in the ‘state of exception’. Branded inferior, crammed into railcars, forced into labor and killed when no longer of use, the victims of the Holocaust experienced the same fate as the chattel of slaughterhouses do today. The justification for this brutality is hinged on the ‘biological inferiority’ of the victims who are dehumanized and denigrated as animals. The “anthropological machine” distinguishing humans from animals collapses when man is stripped down to ‘bare life’ (Agamben). Thus, as long as the exploitation and violent slaughter of animals occurs unrefuted, the potential for genocide remains. As history has shown us time and time again: the realm of nonhuman is not solely occupied by animals. Historical Context: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Patriarchy, slavery and the social matrix of speciesism emerged in tandem to one another from the same region that fathered agriculture in the Middle East during the Chalcolithic Age. Sumer, now modern Iraq, was the first civilization to engage in core agricultural practices such as organized irrigation and specialized labor with slaves and animals. They raised cattle, sheep and pigs, used ox for draught their beast of burden and equids for transport (Sayce 99). The knowledge to store food as standing reserve meant migration was no longer necessary to survive. The population density bred social hierarchies supported at its base by slaves (Kramer 47). In Sumer, there were only two social strata’s to belong to: lu the free man and arad the slave (Kramer 47). Technologies such as branding irons, chains and cages that were developed to dominate animals paved way for the domination over humans too. The “human rule over the lower creatures provided the mental analogue in which many political and social arrangements are based” (Patterson 280). Caged and castrated, slaves were treated no different from chattel. Thousands of years later, the tools developed in the Middle East for domestication were used by the Europeans during colonization to shackle slaves. “When the European settlers arrived in Tasmania in 1772, the indigenous people seem not to have noticed them…By 1830 their numbers had been reduced from around five hundred to seventy-two. In their intervening years they had been used for slave labour and sexual pleasure, tortured and mutilated. They had been hunted like vermin and their skins had been sold for a government bounty. When the males were killed, female survivors were turned loose with the heads of their husbands tied around their necks. Males who were not killed were usually castrated. Children were clubbed to death.” (Gray 91). This horrific account illustrates how the indigenous people of Tasmania were enslaved,skinned and slaughtered by the Europeans. Meanwhile across the globe, the trans-Atlantic slave trade was at its peak in the 18th century. Africans were taken from their native land, branded, bred, and sold as property.

Linguistically these acts of violence and exploitation are tied to animals- branded, skinned, slaughtered, sold. Be that as it may, “as long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other” (Pythagoras in Patterson 210). Racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism and sexism all stem from the same systems of domination that initially subjugated animals. Until we cease to exploit living beings as resources, the threat of man being stripped of his humanity looms. Although we cringe at the inhumane actions of our ancestors, the scale and efficiency of murder and oppression has only advanced, while the notion of ‘human’ remains increasingly obscured.

### Turns Gender

#### The subordination of animals provides the foundation for the violent institutionalization of sexism

Charles Patterson. 2002. Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust. P 12- 13

Karl Jacoby writes that it seems "more than coincidental that the region that yields the first evidence of agriculture, the Middle East, is the same one that yields the first evidence of slavery." Indeed, in the ancient Near East, he writes, slavery was "little more than the extension of domestication to humans.''" Most studies of human slavery have railed to emphasize how the enslavement of animals served as the model and inspiration for the enslavement of humans, but there have been notable exceptions.40 Elizabeth Fisher believes that the sexual subjugation of women, as practiced in all the known civilizations of the world, was modeled after the domestication of animals. "The domestication of women followed the initiation of animal keeping," she writes, "and it was then that men began to control women's reproductive capacity, enforcing chastity and sexual repression."41 Fisher maintains that it was the vertical, hierarchical positioning of human master over animal slave that intensified human cruelty and laid the foundation for human slavery. The violation of animals expedited the violation of human beings. In taking them in and feeding them, humans first made friends with animals and then killed them. To do so, they had to kill some sensitivity in themselves. When they began manipulating the reproduction of animals, they were even more personally involved in practices which led to cruelty, guilt, and subsequent numbness. The keeping of animals would seem to have set a model for the enslavement of humans, in particular the large-scale exploitation of women captives for breeding and labor. 42